Pay-as-you-wish pricing by Chen, Y et al.
LBS Research Online
Y Chen, O Koenigsberg and J Zhang
Pay-as-you-wish pricing
Article
This version is available in the LBS Research Online repository: http://lbsresearch.london.edu/
836/
Chen, Y, Koenigsberg, O and Zhang, J
(2017)
Pay-as-you-wish pricing.
Marketing Science, 36 (5). pp. 780-791. ISSN 0732-2399
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2017.1032
INFORMS
https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2017.1032
c© 2017 INFORMS
Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LBS Research Online for purposes of
research and/or private study. Further distribution of the material, or use for any commercial gain, is
not permitted.
Pay-as-You-Wish Pricing
October 2016
Abstract
Some firms use a curious pricing mechanism called “pay as you wish” pricing (PAYW).
When PAYW is used, a firm lets consumers decide what a product is worth to them
and how much they want to pay to get the product. This practice has been observed
in a number of industries. In this paper, we theoretically investigate why and where
PAYW can be a profitable pricing strategy relative to the conventional “pay as asked”
pricing strategy (PAAP). We show that PAYW has a number of advantages over PAAP
such that it is well suited for some industries but not for others. These advantages
are: 1) PAYW helps a firm to maximally penetrate a market; 2) it allows a firm
to price discriminate among heterogenous consumers; 3) it helps to moderate price
competition. We derive conditions under which PAYW dominates PAAP and discuss
ways to improve the profitability of PAYW.
Keywords: Pricing Strategy, Competitive Price Discrimination, Self-Determined Price
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1 Introduction
Pricing a product or service is typically a seller’s responsibility or in some cases a joint
responsibility for the seller and the buyer if the seller allows, or if the buyer insists on,
haggling. As the seller, it is not always easy to execute that responsibility. At the point of
sales, the seller may want to charge the buyer as much as feasible, but the buyer may want
to pay as little as possible. There lies the potential conflict in every business transaction that
frequently poisons a seller-buyer relationship. It is this conflict that most sellers struggle
to deal with and most buyers complain about. Therefore, it is not surprising that when
Radiohead, the English alternative rock band, announced on October 9, 2007, that it would
let fans to decide how much they would pay, if anything, for downloading its new album In
Rainbows, it immediately caught the media’s attention as well as the imagination of sellers
and buyers alike in the marketplace. With this seemingly novel pay-as-you-wish pricing
mechanism (PAYW), the band does not have to sweat over what price it charges for its
album and fans have nothing to complain about the price they pay.
Of course, PAYW is not new. For ages, street musicians have used this pricing mech-
anism to make a living; museums, such as the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York
city, and other non-for-profit organizations routinely let visitors to decide how much they
pay. There are many more examples like these where firms relinquish their role as the price
setter to consumers. In this paper, we take a first analytical look at this pricing mechanism
to see how and where it may work.
The practice of PAYW raises many questions. First, can PAYW only be used profitably
in an industry with zero or low marginal costs? One would be tempted to say yes based on
the afore-mentioned examples, except that in the restaurant business, where the marginal
cost can be substantial, PAYW is frequently used, too. The restaurant Just Around the
Corner in London, for instance, was reported to have operated profitably under this pricing
mechanism for over two decades. One World Cafe’ in Salt Lake City, Utah, is also one such
thriving restaurant. There are apparently similar examples elsewhere in the world. Then,
a deeper question is: how do marginal costs play a role in determining whether PAYW is
a more profitable pricing mechanism than, say, the commonly used “pay as asked” pricing
mechanism (PAAP)? Second, how do consumers play a role in the profitability of PAYW?
For instance, is it more likely that PAYW would dominate PAAP as a pricing mechanism
if there is a higher concentration of higher willingness to pay customers in the market, or
a higher concentration of low willingness to pay customers is actually more conducive to
the profitability of PAYW? Finally, is it better to use PAYW, instead of PAAP, in a more
2
competitive industry or in a less competitive industry? Our answers to these questions will
help us to articulate the special role of PAYW in the pricing toolkit. They will also help us
to shed light on the observed practices of pay-as-you-wish pricing.
In this paper, we arrive at our answers to these questions through analyzing a simple,
yet instructive theoretical model with a number of extensions. Our analysis will help us to
achieve three research objectives. First, our theoretical modeling allows us to identify the
advantages of PAYW over PAAP as a pricing mechanism so as to accord it a special role
in the pricing toolkit. Our analysis shows that PAYW can help a firm to achieve maximal
market penetration, implement price discrimination, and moderate price competition. Sec-
ond, by deriving the conditions under which PAYW dominates PAAP, we show that PAYW
can be a profitable pricing mechanism in industries where there is a sufficient number of
fair-minded customers, where the distribution of consumers is skewed toward the low end
in terms of consumer willingness to pay, and where the marketplace is very competitive
due to low product differentiation. Our analysis further suggests that zero or very low
marginal costs are not necessary for the application of PAYW. Third, our analysis shows
that requiring or suggesting a minimum price is a good way to improve the profitability of
PAYW, as firms have done in practice.
PAYW pricing has attracted increasing attention from researchers in recent years. Kim
et. al. (2009) examined factors that influence the participation and willingness-to-pay of
consumers in the context of PAYW pricing through field experiments. They find consumer
fairness considerations to be an important driver for the profitability of PAYW pricing.
Besides consumer fairness concerns, researchers have also suggested that the viability of
PAYW pricing mechanism may be affected by many factors such as altruism, customer
satisfaction and customer loyalty (Kim et. al. 2009), the warm-glow experience from
customers (Isaac et. al. 2010), customers’ self-interests of keeping the firm in business
(Mak et. al. 2010), social norm and customer mood (Reiner and Traxler 2012), the con-
sumer identity and self-image considerations (Gneezy et. al. 2012), and market structure
(Schmidt et. al. 2015). Schmidt, et. al. (2015) uses laboratory experiments to analyze the
PAYW strategy. Their experiments confirm that PAYW successfully increases market pen-
etration and that consumers’ payments increase with the firm marginal costs. Furthermore
this paper verifies our finding that PAYW can moderate price competition. In contrast,
our paper relies on an analytical model that complements their experiments and analyzes
other pricing strategies (PAYW with minimum price and Suggested price). In addition,
Gneezy et. al. (2010) show that the combination of PAYW and charitable giving can be
significantly more profitable than that of fixed-price and charitable giving.
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We view consumer fairness concerns as the main motivator for consumers to pay pos-
itive prices under PAYW. Our research contributes to this line of inquiry through analyti-
cally investigating how consumer fairness, firm’s marginal cost, consumer heterogeneity,
and competition affect a firm’s choice of PAYW vs. PAAP. We also derive conditions for
the optimal use of minimum price and suggested price in the implementation of PAYW
pricing. Our research also contributes to a growing literature in marketing and economics
that explores the strategic pricing implications of fair-minded customers (e.g. Fehr and
Schmidt 1999, Feinberg, Krishna and Zhang 2002, Cui, Raju, and Zhang 2007, Chen and
Cui 2013). Our focus here is on how fairness interacts with other factors such as marginal
costs, product differentiation, etc., to make PAYW as a compelling, profitable pricing
mechanism. Our research also contributes to the literature on competitive price discrimina-
tion where numerous studies explore how firm-initiated price discrimination can intensify
price competition to the detriment of competing firms (e.g. Thisse and Vives,1988, Shaffer
and Zhang 1995, 2000 and 2002, Fudenberg and Tirole 2000). In contrast, we show that
while competing firms achieve price discrimination through PAYW, they can all benefit
from it, as price discrimination here is entirely at consumers’ discretion.
In what follows, we start with a simple model and then gradually add complications in
successive sections to isolate how various factors may affect the profitability of PAYW. We
conclude in Section 6 with suggestions for future research.
2 A Simple Model and Analysis
The use of PAYW for “In Rainbows” album was apparently quite successful financially
for Radiohead. According to comScore, a global Internet information provider, 40% of
the US downloaders paid an average of $8.05 for each download, while 36% of worldwide
downloaders paid $6 on average1. Radiohead subsequently disputed those numbers, hint-
ing that more fans have paid2. What is not in dispute is the fact that many loyal fans paid
up even though they did not have to and that the low marginal cost for each download was
conducive to using such a pricing scheme. Therefore, our modeling will start with two
basic factors driving the success of PAYW: fair-minded customers and a low marginal cost.
In practice, as pointed out in Cui, et al (2007), firms may also care about fairness. We shall
1For the original report, see http://ir.comscore.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=273165.
2According to industry insiders, “even utilizing those figures Radiohead most likely did
considerably better financially than if a major label released the album for them.” See
http://www.mp3newswire.net/stories/7002/radiohead-comscore.html.
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abstract away from this complication for now and discuss the implications of relaxing this
assumption in the concluding section.
Consider a market where a firm (such as Radiohead) sells a product (or album)3. We
assume that the firm incurs a marginal production cost of c per unit with 0 ≤ c < 1. To
sell the product to consumers, the firm can choose one of two pricing strategies: PAAP or
PAYW. We assume that each consumer purchases at most one unit of the product and that
each consumer derives a different level of consumption utility from the product, which we
denote with ri. Here, ri is also consumer i’s willingness to pay for the product. To model
consumer heterogeneity, we assume that r is a random variable drawn from a probability
density function φ (r), defined over the domain [0,1], with the corresponding cumulative
distribution function Φ(r). For now we let r to be distributed uniformly over [0,1], i.e.,
φ (r) = 1, and will relax this assumption in Section 4. We normalize the total market size to
one and assume that both the firm and consumers are risk neutral. The consumer i’s utility
from purchasing a product is given by:
ui = ri− pi−β max{(pi− ri0), 0}− γ max{(ri0− pi), 0}, (1)
where pi is the price paid by consumer i, ri0 is the fair price perceived by the consumer,
and β ≥ 0 and γ ≥ 0 are two positive constants such that β max{(pi− ri0), 0} captures
consumer’s disutility towards disadvantageous inequality and γ max{(ri0− pi), 0} captures
consumer’s disutility towards advantageous inequality (Fehr and Schmidt 1999). Note
that the existence of a commonly agreed equitable division of surplus in a transaction as
discussed in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) implies the existence of a commonly agreed fair
price for that transaction. To see this, we note that the total surplus in a transaction in our
model is given by ri−c. If the fair share of this surplus for the consumer is (1−λ )(ri−c),
then the fair price ri0 that the consumer needs to pay to claim his or her fair share is given
by the equation ri − ri0 = (1− λ )(ri − c). Here, λ is the firm’s equitable share of the
total surplus. It can also be interpreted as the generosity of the consumer. A consumer
with higher λ (i.e., a more generous consumer) implies that the consumer is willing to
give the firm a higher share of the total surplus. Then, we have ri0 = λ ri +(1−λ )c. We
shall maintain this definition of the fair price throughout this paper. Note the conceptual
difference between γ and λ . The parameter γ only affects the magnitude of disutility from
advantageous inequality while the parameter λ affects the fair price perceived by consumer,
which influences the disutility from both advantageous and disadvantageous inequality.
3We use the terms product and service interchangeably throughout the paper.
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What this utility function captures is inequity aversion on the part of a fair-minded con-
sumer. By this specification, a fair-minded consumer would derive negative utility when
she experiences disadvantageous inequity, which occurs when pi ≥ ri0, or advantageous in-
equity, which occurs when ri0 ≥ pi (see Fehr and Schmidt 1999 for more details). If ri < c,
we will set ri0 = c. Here, we implicitly assume that consumers know the seller’s marginal
cost c. This may be a reasonable assumption for online music productions as the marginal
cost is very low or zero4. Similarly, low or zero marginal costs for information products or
museum visits prevail. Of course, in very competitive commodity industries, such costs are
also transparent to consumers. Indeed, Internet today has made the costs of many products
transparent to consumers as any teardown analysis of a device gets disseminated quickly5.
We let γ follow a distribution with the corresponding density and cumulative distribution
functions of, h(γ) and H(γ) respectively, with γ < 1λ . This assumption will allow us to
endogenize the fraction of consumers who are free-loaders, as we will see shortly6.
To sell the product to consumers, the firm can choose one of the two pricing strategies:
PAAP or PAYW. When the firm chooses PAAP, it sets a price denoted by p. In this case,
as a firm with pricing power, it is never optimal for the firm to set a price such that the
marginal consumers pay less than their perceived fair price. If this were not the case, then,
the reservation prices for marginal consumers, r˜i, would be determined by
r˜i− p− γi(λ r˜i +(1−λ )c− p) = 0, where λ r˜i +(1−λ )c≥ p.
However, we can easily show that as long as p > c, which must be the case for the firm
with pricing power, we must have
r˜i =
p(1− γi)+(1−λ )γic
1−λγi
< p, for all γi < 1λ .
This would then imply λ r˜i + (1− λ )c < p, a contradiction. Thus, the optimal solution
occurs with marginal consumers suffering through disadvantageous inequity. Said differ-
ently, when the firm behaves optimally, it wants to charge and is charging a price higher
than the equitable price. Because of this, the firm is worse off if β is larger, a fact that
we will use later to prove our claims. A consumer with ri will purchase the product at the
4We thank AE for making this suggestion.
5A good example is how quickly consumers know the cost of iphone 6 that IHS estimated to be between
$200 and $247 depending on specific models. See http://recode.net/2014/09/23/teardown-shows-apples-
iphone-6-cost-at-least-200-to-build/
6Here, the assumption of λ γ < 1 does allow these two variables to be positively or negatively correlated
in the allowable parameter space. However, until the behavior literature suggests specific correlation, we
shall maintain this more general parameter space. We thank an anynamous reviewer for clarifying this point.
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posted price p if and only if ri ≥ p+ β (1−λ )(p−c)1+λβ = r∗ and the firm’s profits are then simply
given by:
piu =
∫ 1
r∗
[(p− c)φ(r)dr]. (2)
The expressions for the firm’s optimal price and profits under PAAP are given respec-
tively by:
p∗ =
1+ c+β (λ +2c− cλ )
2(1+β ) , and piU =
(1− c)2(1+λβ )
4(1+β ) . (3)
When the firm adopts PAYW, it does not set a price for the product. Instead, each
consumer decides the amount she pays. Consumers with valuation ri ≥ c pay zero dollars
if γi ≤ 1, as the utility from avoiding advantageous inequity for these consumers is always
smaller than disutility associated with paying a price. However, they will pay the perceived
equitable price ri0 if γi > 1. Similarly, consumers with valuation ri < c pay zero dollars if
γi ≤ 1 and do not buy if γi > 1. We define θ =
∫ 1
0 h(γi)d(γi) as the proportion of consumers
that do not pay for the product. Note that the consumer’s payment is always not larger
than ri0 and, depending on λ and γi, the consumer may pay up to their reservation price ri
(ri0 = ri if λ = 1). In this case, the firm’s profits are given by:
pip =
∫ 1
c
[(1−θ)λ (ri− c)φ(ri)dri]− cθ . (4)
Note that the profit function above is not at all related to β . This is because a fair-minded
consumer will never pay voluntarily a price higher than the equitable price. If she does,
she will suffer on two accounts: the disutility from a higher price and the disutility from
disadvantageous inequity! Also note that if θ = 1, then pip is negative so that PAYW can
never be optimal. This suggests that at least some consumers should have γi > 1 for PAYW
to be profitable. This is intuitive as γi > 1 implies that a consumer care more about not
being unfair to the seller than saving from price paid. We leave the estimate of γi and
the measure of the segment size of fair-mind consumers (i.e., those with γi > 1) to future
empirical research.
The profits for the firm if it adopts PAYW are:
pip =
λ (1−θ)(1− c)2
2
− cθ . (5)
As the firm adopts the PAYW only when pip > piu, we can show that PAYW is optimal if
and only if
c < 1−
2θ(1+β )−2√θ(1+β )[θ(1+β )(1−2λ )+λ (2+β )−1]
1−λ [2+β −2θ(1+β )] = c
∗(β ,θ ,λ ). (6)
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Condition (6) offers some quick insights about where PAYW can be a superior pricing
mechanism relative to PAAP.
Proposition 1. At any given θ , β and for sufficient large λ , the marginal cost c must be
sufficiently small for a firm to choose PAYW over PAAP. However, a low marginal cost is
not a sufficient condition. Even at the zero marginal cost, PAYW will not dominate PAAP
as a pricing mechanism if too many of the consumers are freeloaders (c∗(β ,1,λ )< 0) .
Proposition 1 is consistent with our observations that PAYW is mostly used in industries
with small marginal costs. It also confirms a very intuitive idea: a firm will adopt PAYW
if consumers are sufficiently “fair-minded” in that they are willing to compensate the firm
voluntarily even when they do not have to and they feel bad or suffer disutilities when they
are not paying an equitable price. Therefore, the success of PAYW will critically hinge on
the kind of customers a firm attracts.
We note that the firm’s profits under PAAP decreases with β as we have pointed out
before, while the firm’s profits under PAYW is independent of β . This means that we
can simplify our analysis hereafter without sacrificing any generality of our substantive
conclusions and analyze the case of β = 0 for two reasons. First, consumers will never
voluntarily create this disutility by paying more than the fair price. Second, by setting
β = 0, we simply make PAAP more profitable so that we actually stack the deck against
us, showing that PAYW can be chosen over PAAP7.
3 Managing Profitability under PAYW
If a firm decides to give PAYW a try, can it do anything further to enhance its profitabil-
ity? The answer is affirmative. Here we discuss two approaches favored by practitioners:
PAYW with the minimum price and PAYW with a suggested price.
3.1 PAYW with the Minimum Price
A firm may adopt PAYW, but with an enhanced feature of the minimum price: setting the
lower bound for the price paid, but allowing consumers to pay as much as they wish as
long as the payment exceeds this lower bound. For example, the organizers of the 2005
Los-Angeles Human Rights Watch Annual Dinner8 announced that “Sponsorship packages
7This intuition is readily confirmed in Appendix G where we assume, as in Fehr and Schmidt (1999),
β > γ > 0.
8See www.hrwcalifornia.org/south/LAdinner2005/dinner2005.htm
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start at $3,000...” Does this minimum price always enhance the firm’s profitability? If it
does, how? We investigate these two questions here.
To start, we assume that the firm sets a minimum price, p. With the minimum price,
freeloaders (θ in size) purchase a unit if and only if their r ≥ p, and must pay the minimum
price p when making their purchase. Fair-minded consumers (1−θ in size) are not affected
by the minimum price if p < c as only those with r ≥ c will make a purchase. However,
if p ≥ c, fair-minded consumers buy only if r ≥ p and pay max[c+ λ (r− c), p]. Thus,
there are three relevant intervals we need to consider: p < c, c ≤ p ≤ λ +(1−λ )c, and
p > λ +(1−λ )c9
It is easy to see that when p < c the firm’s profits increases with p, as the buying
behavior of fair-minded consumers is not at all affected by the minimum price. Conse-
quently, the firm is better off raising the minimum price toward c. At the other end, when
p> λ +(1−λ )c, the firm’s profits are weakly dominated by PAAP, as the firm is effectively
charging all consumers the same price. Thus, the only relevant case for finding the firm’s
optimal minimum price is where c≤ p≤ λ +(1−λ )c.
Note that PAYW is a special case of PAYW plus the minimum price with p set at 0.
This means that the firm can never do worse with the option of setting the minimum price
if the minimum price is set optimally. Under PAYW plus the minimum price, the firm
can force high willingness-to-pay freeloaders to pay the minimum price and screen out
the rest who are not willing to pay the price and are a drag for the firm’s profitability.
In addition, the firm can collect more payments from those fair-minded customers with
r ∈ [p, p−(1−λ )cλ ] who would have paid voluntarily a price lower than p. However, the down
side is that PAYW plus the minimum price will also screen out the fair-minded customers
with r ∈ [c, p] who would have paid a price higher than the marginal cost c. Therefore,
how much setting the minimum price will improve the firm’s profitability will depend on
the tradeoffs among these factors.
Under the uniform distribution of r, when c≤ p≤ λ +(1−λ )c, the firm’s profits are
pi2mp = (1−θ)[
λ (1− c)2
2
+
(1−2λ )(p− c)2
2λ ]+θ(p− c)(1− p). (7)
The firm’s problem is to choose the minimum price that maximizes this profit expression.
Define p = θλ (1−c)2λ−1+θ + c as the price that maximizes equation (7). Thus, the following
proposition summarizes our analysis.
9λ +(1−λ )c is a cutoff point because max[c+λ (ri−c), p]=c+λ (ri−c) can occur only if p≤ λ +(1−
λ )c as we have ri ≤ 1.
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Proposition 2. The firm’s optimal minimum price when conusmers’ consumption utilities
are distributed uniformly, p∗, is Max[c,Min[p,λ +(1− λ )c]]. Furthermore, the optimal
minimum price increases with the marginal cost c (∂ p
∗
∂c > 0), increases with the proportion
of freeloaders θ (∂ p∗∂θ > 0), and decreases with the generosity of fair-minded consumers λ
(∂ p
∗
∂λ < 0).
Intuitively, PAYW plus the minimum price is essentially a pricing mechanism that al-
lows the firm to charge the minimum price to freeloaders and variable prices to fair-minded
consumers and it is a hybrid instrument that combines PAAP and PAYW. As the firm has
more an incentive to charge high willingness-to-pay freeloaders and screen out the rest
when c or θ is larger, it will raise the minimum price as stated in Proposition 2. This
incentive is only tampered by the fact that a higher minimum price will also screen out
more fair-minded consumers, especially when they become more generous. From this
perspective, it is easy to see why we have p∗ = c when θ = 0 as expected, for such a price
is not binding for any fair-minded consumers. Furthermore, it is easy to show that we have
p∗ ≤ 1+c2 , the optimal price under PAAP. The lower minimum price would allow the firm
to expand the demand among fair-minded consumers.
3.2 Suggested Price
Another common practice is PAYW with a suggested price: a firm does not provide an
explicit lower bound for the price, but does post a suggested price. More specifically, a
firm may suggest a price but let consumers pay as much as they wish. For instance, The
Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City suggests a donation of $25 for admission.
This pricing mechanism is designed to affect fair-minded consumers. It has no effect on
freeloaders, as they will simply disregard the suggestion.
To see how a suggested price may enhance a firm’s profitability, we need to modify our
previous model and introduce the purchase decision rules for fair-minded consumers when
a suggested price, ps, is present. We assume that with probability z a consumer ignores
the suggested price in her decision making. With probability (1− z), however, a consumer
is influenced by suggested price in such a way that she may feel embarrassed for paying
less than the suggested price. Therefore, if c+λ (r− c) ≥ ps, fair-minded consumers pay
c+λ (r− c); if c+λ (r− c) < ps ≤ r, with probability z they pay c+λ (r− c), and with
probability (1− z) they pay ps; if c+ λ (r− c) ≤ r < ps, with probability z consumers
purchase the product and pay c+λ (r− c),with probability 0.5(1− z) consumers purchase
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the product and pay r and with probability 0.5(1− z) do not make any purchase at all;10 if
r < c, fair-minded consumers do not purchase as before.
Under the uniform distribution of r, when ps−(1−λ )cλ ≤ 1, the firm’s profits are given by
the following expression11
pi1s = (1−θ)

∫ 1
ps−(1−λ )c
λ
λ (r− c)dr+
∫ ps−(1−λ )c
λ
ps
[zλ (r− c)+(1− z)(ps− c)]dr
+[zλ +(1− z)12 ]
∫ ps
c
(r− c)dr
−θc
and when ps−(1−λ )cλ > 1, the firm’s profits are given by
pi2s = (1−θ)
[
[
∫ 1
ps
[zλ (r− c)+(1− z)(ps− c)]dr+[zλ +(1− z)
1
2
]
∫ ps
c
(r− c)dr
]
−θc
The firm’s problem under PAYW with a suggested price is to choose the optimal suggested
price, ps, that will maximize the profit functions (pi1s and pi2s ). The following proposition
summarizes our analysis.
Proposition 3. The firm’s optimal suggested price when consumers’ valuations are dis-
tributed uniformly is: ps =
{
2+c
3 if λ ≤ 23 ,
c if λ > 23 .
The suggested price always increases with
the marginal cost c. In addition, a higher price is suggested if fair-minded consumers are
not sufficiently generous.
As shown in Proposition 3, the optimal suggested price is independent of θ . This is
expected as the suggested price does not affect the behavior of freeloaders. Proposition 3
also suggests that it can be optimal to set ps = c when λ is large enough. When λ > 23 ,
any suggested price larger than c will cause some fair-minded consumers to drop out of
the market and the cost of such drop-outs would be too large relative to any gain from the
suggested price. To avoid this cost, the firm can set the suggested price at c so that it does
10When ps > r, it is possible that those who feel embarrassed for not paying ps may decide not to purchase
at all. However, it is also possible that consumers may feel justifiable to pay r and make a purchase as this
is the best the consumer can do. In order to take into account both possibilities, we assume a 50 percents
split between these two possibilities. Using other splits of those possibilities significantly complicates the
mathematical derivations but will not qualitatively change our results.
11c+λ (r− c)≥ ps can occur only if ps−(1−λ )cλ ≤ 1 because r ≤ 1.
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not alter the buying behavior of the fair-minded consumers at all. Then, PAYW with a
suggested price is functionally the same as PAYW.
Although PAYW with the minimum price and PAYW with a suggested price can both
enhance a firm’s profitability, they are clearly not equivalent pricing mechanisms. PAYW
with the minimum price, as the analysis in this section shows, targets freeloaders, while
PAYW with a suggested price focuses on exploiting fair-minded consumers. Then, how
should a firm choose between the two? We answer that question in the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 4. If fair-minded consumers are sufficiently generous (λ > 23), the firm is better
off adopting PAYW with the minimum price. If they are not sufficiently generous (λ ≤ 23),
PAYW with the minimum price is optimal if θ > Max{1−2λ ,θ∗ (z,c,λ )};12 PAYW with a
suggested price is optimal if θ ≤Min{θ∗ (z,c,λ ) , [(1−c)2[1−z(4−6λ )]]
[4[1+c+c2−z(1−c)2]+6zλ (1−c)2]} and PAAP
is optimal if [(1−c)2[1−z(4−6λ )]]
[4[1+c+c2−z(1−c)2]+6zλ (1−c)2] ≤ θ ≤ Min{1−2λ ,θ
∗ (c,λ )}.
Intuitively, what Proposition 4 suggests is that if the fair-minded consumers are suffi-
ciently generous, the focus of a pricing decision maker should be on getting freeloaders to
pay through a minimum price. If the fair-minded consumers are not sufficiently generous,
the focus should be still on freeloaders if there are a sufficient number of them in the
market. If the number is sufficiently low, the firm can still profitably deploy PAYW by
focusing on fair-minded consumers and using a suggested price.
Interestingly, our conclusions seem quite consistent with practice based on some ca-
sual observations. In political fundraising where there are likely many generous donors as
well as many free-loaders who have the capacity to pay, organizers frequently imposing a
minimum price as the example at the beginning of subsection 3.1 illustrates. In the case of
supporting civic culture and communities, e.g. Met and yoga studios, there are likely much
fewer true freeloaders13. This is also where we observe frequently the usage of a suggested
price in conjunction with PAYW14.
12Where θ ∗ (z,c,λ ) = 2−2z−c[1−2c(1−z)]−4z−5λ−λ [c(4−5c)+5z(1−c)2]+3λ (1−z)(1−c)2+B2[1+c+c2−z(1−c)2]+3zλ (1−c)2 and B =√
[3c2− 2λ [1− z− c[2−2z− c(4− z)]]+3λ2(1− c)2(1− z)][3−2λ [4− z− c(2− c)(1− z)]+3λ 2(1− c)2(1− z)].
13Our conjecture that there are more free-loaders in political fundraising as many of them may feel that
their mere presence and time spent at the event has already contributed to the candidate as a demonstration
of support.
14See “To Pay or Not to Pay,” by Sumanthi Reddy, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, November 10, 2011.
We thank an anynamous reviewer for suggesting this connection.
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4 Non-uniform distribution of reservation prices
Up to this point, our analysis has focused on marginal costs, freeloaders, and customer
generosity as the determinants for choosing PAYW over PAAP, and on how to improve
PAYW if it is chosen. This analysis is conducted under the assumption that consumer
willingness to pay is uniformed distributed. However, in reality, consumer distribution
is unlikely to be uniform and there can be more consumers with high reservation prices
than those with low reservation prices in the market and vice versa. Then, to explore
the determinants for PAYW further, two questions arise naturally. First, does a firm’s
incentive to adopt PAYW increase when there is more a concentration of high reservation
price consumers? Intuitively, the answer should be affirmative, as a higher reservation price
customer has a higher perceived equitable price and hence pays more when she is free to
choose what to pay. Second, is it always the case that a higher marginal cost reduce a firm’s
incentives to adopt PAYW regardless of how consumers are distributed in the marketplace?
The answer to this question is also affirmative, on the first blush, as the increase in marginal
costs can only increase a firm’s cost of adopting PAYW when free loaders are around. We
now investigate both questions by specifying a more general distribution function.
Consider, for instance, that consumers’ reservation prices are generated from a trape-
zoid distribution function with φ (r) = a+ 2(1− a)r and Φ(r) = ar + (1− a)r2, where
0 ≤ a ≤ 2. Note that when a = 1, we recover the unifrom distribution. When a < 1, we
have the case where the firm’s customers are more affluent in the sense that more consumers
have high reservation prices (∂φ(r)∂ r > 0). When a > 1, the firm faces more consumers with
low reservation prices (∂φ(r)∂ r < 0)(see Figure 1).
In order to get more intuition without being hampered by unnecessarily complex ex-
pressions, we set θ = 0, i.e., all consumers pay when the firm follows the PAYW strategy.
Clearly, this assumption will make PAYW a more attractive pricing mechanism relative to
PAAP and hence all conclusions in this section should be interpreted in the context of this
assumption15. However, our analysis here focuses on the distribution of consumers as an
incremental determinant, and our conclusions will not be substantively altered as long as
free loading is not so severe that PAYW is never selected over PAAP.
With a trapezoid distribution, if the firm adopts PAAP, its optimal price and profit are
given by:16
15We thank an anynamous reviewer for suggesting this caution.
16The following apply to cases of a 6= 1. The optimal price and profits of PAAP and PAYW for a = 1 are
given in (3) and (5).
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Figure 1: Probability Density Function of Trapezoid Distribution
pu =
(1−a)c−a+Z
3(1−a)
, piu =
[3−2a− c(1−a)+Z] [2ac−a−2c+Z] [3+ c−a(1+ c)+Z]
27(1−a)2
,
(8)
where Z =
√
[a− (1−a)c]2 +3(1−a)(1+ac).
If the firm adopts PAYW, we can use equation (3) to derive the firm’s profit as
pip =
λ
6 (1− c)
2[2(2+ c)−a(1+2c)].
Before we proceed, define
λ ∗ (c,a) = 2[3− c−a(2− c)−Z] [a+2c−2ac−Z] [3+ c−a(1+ c)+Z]
[−9(1−a)2 (1− c)2 [4−a+2c(1−a)]]
.
A comparison of these two profit functions leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 5. The firm should adopt PAYW when fair-minded consumers are sufficiently
generous (λ > λ ∗ (c,a)), but should adopt PAAP if they are not (λ ≤ λ ∗ (c,a)). Further-
more, λ ∗ decreases with a. λ ∗ decreases with c for 0 ≤ a < 1, but increases with c for
1 < a≤ 2. 17
17The results in Proposition 5 holds also for β > 0. As expected, λ ∗ decreases with β because the profits
from PAAP decrease with β but the profits from PAYW are invariant with β . Please see Appendices A and
G for details.
14
The first part of Proposition 5 essentially confirms our previous conclusion in Proposi-
tion 1 that consumer generosity is conducive to the adoption of PAYW. More importantly,
however, the second part of Proposition 5 suggests that how consumers’ utilities are dis-
tributed, a in our case, is also an important determinant in a firm’s pricing choice. Here,
we find that it is not a higher concentration of high willingness consumers that is more
conducive to the adoption of PAYW, but to the contrary, a higher concentration of low
willingness to pay consumers that will motivate the firm to use PAYW. In other words, the
greater the concentration of the low willingness to pay consumers, the lower the portion of
the value that consumers must transfer to the firm to induce it to adopt PAYW. Interestingly,
anecdotal evidence seems to support this conclusion that PAYW tends to be observed, by
and large, in markets where there is a concentration of low willingness to pay customers,
whether it is for selling music, museum admissions, or food and beverages.
The intuition behind this conclusion is that under PAYW, the firm’s demand is 1−
Φ(c), while under PAAP, it is 1−Φ(p∗). Given that p∗ > c, this must mean that the
demand enhancing effect of PAYW is stronger when a is larger, as more consumers have
low consumption utilities in the neighborhood of the marginal cost c, the cutoff point for
marginal consumers under PAYW.18 In other words, a larger a will add more profitable
sales as the firm switch from PAAP to PAYW.
Proposition 5 also shows that the effect of changes in marginal costs on the threshold
level of λ depends on the level of a. As expected, the adoption of PAYW is less likely
(a higher λ ∗) if the marginal cost c is larger. However, this happens only when there is a
small concentration of high willingness to pay consumers (a > 1). When there is a larger
concentration of high willingness to pay consumers (a< 1), the adoption of PAYW actually
becomes more likely (a lower λ ∗) as c increases. In other words, a higher marginal cost
gives the firm more, instead of less, incentives to adopt PAYW, when more consumers in
the market have high willingness to pay. This perhaps explains why in a high marginal cost
industry, like in the restaurant business, a firm like Around the Corner can profitably use
PAYW. The key is to attract a high concentration of high willingness to pay customers!
Intuitively, when a < 1, the demand enhancing effect of PAYW becomes stronger when
c increases as more consumers are excluded from buying the product under PAAP than
under PAYW. Consequently, the firm is more likely to adopt PAYW when a < 1 and c
18Precisely, we have Φ(p∗)−Φ(c) = Φ(c+ 1−Φ(p
∗)
φ(p∗) )−Φ(c) =
1−Φ(p∗)
φ(p∗) φ(p′) according to the mean value
theorem where c < p′ < p∗ and p′ = c+p
∗
2 under the trapezoid distribution. Because p
∗ decreases with a as
more consumers are in the low end of the consumption utility distribution and φ(p
′)
φ(p∗) increases with a as the
curve of φ(ri) becomes “steeper” with a increasing, we have 1−Φ(p∗)φ(p∗) φ(p′) increases with a.
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increases. We can see this from the fact that there are more consumers in the high end
of the consumption utility distribution so that we have φ (c) < φ (p∗), where φ (c) is the
marginal demand reduction under PAYW when c increases, and φ (p∗) is the marginal
demand reduction under PAAP when c increases (p∗ increases with c.). In contrast, φ (c)>
φ (p∗) when a > 1 because there are more consumers at the low end of the consumption
utility distribution. Therefore, the demand enhancing effect of PAYW becomes weaker
when c increases so that the firm is less likely to adopt it. The above discussion also
explains why λ ∗ is invariant with c when consumers’ willingness to pay follows a uniform
distribution as φ (c) = φ (p∗) in that case.
In summary, the analysis in this section suggests three testable hypotheses. First, when
consumers are more generous in that they are willing to let the firm to keep more of the
surplus in a transaction, the firm is more likely to adopt PAYW. Second, a higher concen-
tration of low willingness to pay customers are conducive to a firm’s adopting PAYW, all
else being equal. Third, a higher marginal cost can incentivize a firm to adopt PAYW if
there is a concentration of high willingness to pay consumers.
5 Competition
Our analysis so far has shown that the PAYW strategy can be optimal for a monopoly
firm. When competition is absent, the PAYW strategy can dominate the PAAP strategy
primarily because of the fact that PAYW allows a firm to maximally take advantage of the
market demand and to price discriminate among heterogenous consumers. However, it is
not clear if in a competitive context, the same incentives would motivate a firm to choose
PAYW over PAAP. In their pioneering research, Thisse and Vives (1988) show that firms
always have an incentive to choose a flexible pricing policy in a competitive context such
that price discrimination by all competing firms is an unique equilibrium. Furthermore, in
such an equilibrium, the competing firms are all worse off than if they both choose to set a
uniform price, charging all consumers the same price. In this section, we investigate how
competition affects a firm’s choice between PAYW and PAAP and whether competing firms
are always worse off when choosing PAYW. Once again, we avoid the complication of
having freeloaders, whose presence will affect whether PAYW will be chosen over PAAP,
but not why competition may or may not be conducive to a firm’s choice of PAYW.
To do that, we relax the monopoly assumption and assume that there are two competing
firms A and B that are located at the two ends of the Hotelling line bounded between zero
and one. Both firms (A and B) incur the same marginal costs per unit c. Consumers
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are uniformly distributed along the Hotelling line and incur a constant unit transportation
costs, t. Thus, a consumer located at x on the Hotelling line incurs a disutility of tx if he
purchases the product from firm A and t (1− x) if he purchases the product from firm B. As
before, we assume that consumers all have the same consumption utility from the product
in the market denoted by V and they are fair-minded as defined before in Equation 1 with
0≤ λ ≤ 1. As before, we shall focus our analysis on the case of β = 0 19.
Competing firms play a two-stage game. In the first stage, each firm to choose one
of the two strategies: PAYW (P) or PAAP (U). As each firm has two options for its
pricing strategy, there are four subgames: both firms follow the PAAP strategy (UU ),
both firms follow the PAYW strategy (PP), one firm follows the PAYW strategy and the
second chooses the PAAP strategy (PU ) and (UP). In the second stage, prices are set
independently or realized depending upon the choices in the first stage.
It is straighforward to analyze these four subgames and derive the equilibrium for the
competitive pricing policy game20. We summarize our analysis in the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 6. When consumers are sufficiently fair-minded, i.e. λ ≥ λ ∗, where 0 < λ ∗ =
4t
4V−4c−t < 1, the unique Pareto dominance equilibrium is for both firms to choose PAYW
(PP). If otherwise, both firms choose PAAP (UU)21. In the equilibrium where firms choose
PAYW, they can both be better off than if they were both to choose PAAP. Furthermore, if
the market is less differentiated and hence more competitive (a samller t), competing firms
are more likely to choose PAYW (a smaller λ ∗).
Proposition 6 offers two interesting insights about PAYW as a pricing mechanism.
First, PAYW can help a firm to achieve price discrimination as does location-specific
pricing discussed in Thisse and Vives (1988). However, by choosing PAYW, a firm does
not acquire the same pricing fexibility that the location-specific pricing policy bestows a
firm. Said differently, PAYW does not allow a firm to set any price for a specific loca-
tion at will, as consumers at different locations decide themselves what to pay. For that
reason, competing firms do not always choose to price-discriminate through PAYW in our
model, while they do in Thisse and Vives (1988) in a bid to acquire pricing flexibility.
Second, PAYW can help firms to achieve price discrimination without intensifying price
19As can be easily seen from Appendix G, assuming β > 0 does not affect our results below if we assume
that the fair price, ri0, of a firm given the price of its competitor is the price that makes a consumer indifferent
between buying from the focus firm or buying from the competing.
20The analysis of the four cases are in the Appendix F.
21When multiple equilibria exist, we use the Pareto dominance criterion to refine the equilibria
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competition, in contrast to location-specific pricing that always worsens price competition
as shown by Thisse and Vives. Indeed, PAYW can moderate price competition, as prices
in the market become autonomous and competing firms no longer set any prices. For
that reason, competing firms may not be caught in a Prisoner’s dilemma situation. Also
for that reason, the more competitve the marketplace becomes, because of less product
differentiation (a smaller t), the more likely it is for competing firms to adopt PAYW. In
a more competitive market, a firm simply has more an incentive to surrender its pricing
discretion to consumers.
Therefore, it is not surprising that we tend to see PAYW in more competitive industries
and during economic downturns.
6 Conclusion
We have shown in this paper that given the right conditions, a firm may very well do better
letting consumers to decide how much a product is worth and how much they pay to get the
product, instead of posting a price itself. PAYW can dominate PAAP as a pricing mecha-
nism because it, first and foremost, helps a firm to achieve maximum market penetration.
By letting buyers to determine the prices they pay, the firm has taken away the last obstacle
that a consumer faces in making a purchase. Furthermore, PAYW is also an effective
way for a firm to implement price discrimination. Traditionally, price discrimination is
achieved through either consumer self-selection or firm targeting. PAYW is essentially an
autonomous price discrimination mechanism that allows consumers to pay different prices
out of their fairness concerns or conscience. This form of price discrimination has the
unique advantage of moderating price competition: competing firms no longer set prices
so that they cannot help but competing on factors other than price.
The right conditions we have identified for adopting PAYW are essentially three. First,
the existence of fair-minded customers in a market and their sufficient generosity are the
necessary conditions for PAYW to be more profitable than PAAP. If all consumers are self-
interested and economically rational, PAYW can never be an optimal strategy for selling a
product unless, of course, the firm uses PAYW to achieve some other strategic objectives.
When these conditions are present, we have shown that the marginal cost of the product
needs to be sufficiently small, too, but not necessarily close to zero. A lower marginal
cost should allow a firm to tolerate more freeloaders. Second, as PAAP is most effective
at exploiting the high end of a demand, while PAYW the low end, it is not surprising that
a high concentration of low willingness to pay customers is conducive to a firm adopting
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PAYW. For the same reason, in a high-end market where there is a high concentration
of high willingness to pay customers, a higher marginal cost should give a firm more an
incentive to adopt PAYW in place of PAAP. Third, a highly competitive marketplace is
where PAYW is more likely to dominate PAAP. In the extreme case of perfect competition,
for instance, competing firms will charge a price equal to marginal costs under PAAP and
make zero profit. However, under PAYW, firms cannot and do not compete on price. They
make the profit that fair-minded consumers are willing to let them.
Our analysis has also shown that a firm can improve its profitability under PAYW by
imposing a minimum price or posting a suggested price. The minimum price can screen out
freeloaders while the suggested price can modify the paying behaviors of fair-minded cus-
tomers. Indeed, from our model, we can see that anything that a firm can do to encourage
consumers to become more fair-minded can also achieve the same objective.
Thus, the parsimonious models in our analysis have allowed us to uncover some of the
major factors conducive to a firm’s choice of PAYW and the improvement mechanisms
for PAYW. However, the future research can take at least two intriguing directions, which
we have barely scratched the surface here22. First, we have investigated the case where
all consumers know the marginal cost of a product. This may not be the case in some
industries. A natural question is then how consumer cost uncertainties may affect a firm’s
incentives to adopt PAYW? Would a high technology company, for instance, have more or
less an incentive to adopt PAYW, all else being equal, if consumers have little knowledge
about its costs? Second, in our models, we only allow consumers to be fair-minded. In
practice, firms can also be fair-minded in some contexts. How could the fairness concern
on the part of firms affect their choice of PAYW relative to PAAP? We venture to suggest
that both directions promise some good insights into the present and future practice of
PAYW.
7 Appendix
A - Proposition 1: Analysis of the case when β > 0 and ri follows a uniform distribution:
Under the uniform distribution of ri, the optimal price and profits of a firm that adopts
the PAAP are given respectively by:
p∗ =
1+ c+β (λ +2c− cλ )
2(1+β ) , and piU =
(1− c)2(1+λβ )
4(1+β ) .
22We thank the review team for this paper to encourage us to think in these directions.
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Note that the profits under PAAP decreases with β : pi∗U∂β = (1−c)
2(−1+λ )
4(1+β )2 < 0. The profits for
the firm if it adopts PAYW are:
pip =
λ (1−θ)(1− c)2
2
− cθ . (9)
As the firm adopts the PAYW only when pi1p > pi1u , we can show that PAYW is optimal
if and only if
c < 1−
2θ(1+β )−2√θ(1+β )[θ(1+β )(1−2λ )+λ (2+β )−1]
1−λ [2+β −2θ(1+β )] = c
∗(β ,θ ,λ ). (10)
B - Proposition 2: In order to find the optimal minimum price we derive the profits
pi2mp = (1−θ)[
λ (1−c)2
2 +
(1−2λ )(p−c)2
2λ ]+θ(p−c)(1− p) with respect to price, p. This first
order condition yields p∗ = θλ−(1−θ−2λ+θλ )c1−θ−2λ = c−
θλ (1−c)
1−θ−2λ . Deriving the optimal price
with respect to costs yields; ∂ p
∗
∂c = 1+
θλ
1−θ−2λ , which is positive for values of θ ≤ 1−2λ
or θ ≥ 1−2λ1−λ . Deriving the optimal price with respect to θ ; yields
∂ p∗
∂θ =
λ (1−c−2λ+2cλ )
(1−θ−2λ )2 =
λ (1−c)(1−2λ )
(1−θ−2λ )2 , which is positive for λ >
1
2 (always true for PAYW to be optimal). Deriving
the optimal price with respect to λ ; yields ∂ p
∗
∂λ = −
θ (1−c)(1−θ )
(1−θ−2λ )2 , which is always negative
(as c < 1 and θ < 1).
C - Proposition 3: We first find the optimal suggested price that maximizes pi1sp . The first
order condition of pi1sp with respect to ps;
∂pi1sp
∂ ps , yields p
∗
1s = c. The first order condition of
pi2sp with respect to ps;
∂pi2sp
∂ ps , yields p
∗
2s =
2+c
3 . Comparing these two optimal profit function
we get;pi1sp
(
p∗1s
)
=−cθ + λ (1−c)
2(1−θ )
2 and pi
2s
p
(
p∗2s
)
= −cθ + [2+z(3λ−2)](1−c)
2(1−θ )
6 . It is
easy to see that pi1sp
(
p∗1s
)
−pi2sp
(
p∗2s
)
=
(1−c)2(1−θ )(1−z)(3λ−2)
6 which is positive for λ > 23 .
Thus, the optimal suggested price is given by ps = 2+c3 if λ ≤ 23 and ps = c if λ > 23 . Note
that 2+c3 − c =
2(1−c)
3 > 0.
D - Proposition 4: The firm profits when it adopts the PAYW with minimum price are
pi2mp =
(1−c)2λ [1−2θ (1−λ )−2λ ]
2(1−θ−2λ ) , the firms profits when it adopts the PAYW with suggested
price are pi1sp = λ2 (1−θ)(1− c)2− cθ , for λ > 23 and pi2sp =−cθ +
[2+z(3λ−2)](1−c)2(1−θ )
6 ,
for λ ≤ 23 , the firm profits when it adopts the PAAP pricing strategy is pi1u =
(1−c)2
4 .
For values of λ > 23 , pi2mp −pi1sp =
θ [λ [4c+θ (1−c)2]−2c(1−θ )]
2(−1+θ+2λ ) which is positive for all values
as θ > 0 > c(2−4λ )2c+λ (1−c)2 . pi
2m
p − pi
1
u =
(1−c)2(1−θ )(1−2λ )2
4(−1+θ+2λ ) which is always positive for θ >
1−2λ (as 1−2λ < 0 for λ > 12).
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For values of λ ≤ 23 , pi2mp −pi2sp = cθ +
[2+z(3λ−2)](1−c)2(1−θ )
6 +
(1−c)2λ [1−2λ−2θ (1−λ )]
2(1−θ−2λ )
which is positive for values of θ > θ∗ (z,c,λ ) . pi2mp − pi1u = (1−c)
2(1−θ )(1−2λ )2
4(−1+θ+2λ ) which is
positive for θ > 1− 2λ . pi2sp −pi1u = (1−c)
2(1−θ )[2−z(2−3λ ]
6 − cθ −
(1−c)2
4 which is positive
for θ < [(1−c)
2[1−z(4−6λ )]]
[4[1+c+c2−z(1−c)2]+6zλ (1−c)2] .
E - Proposition 5: The firm profits when she adopts the PAYW pricing strategy
are: pi1u =
[3−2a−c(1−a)+Z][2ac−a−2c+Z][3+c−a(1+c)+Z]
27(1−a)2
. The firm profits when she adopts the
PAAP pricing strategy are pi1p = λ6 (1− c)
2[2(2+ c)− a(1+2c)]. It is easy to verify that
pi1u −pi
1
p = 0 for λ = λ ∗ (c,a) = 2[3−c−a(2−c)−Z](a+2c−2ac−Z)[3+c−a(1+c)+Z][−9(1−a)2(1−c)2[4−a+2c(1−a)]]
F - Proposition 6: We start with the analysis of the scenario where both firms follow the
PAAP strategy (UU ). Assume V is sufficiently large so that the market is always covered.
In this case consumer located in x gains surplus of V − tx− p1 if buying the product from
firm A and gains surplus of V − t (1− x)− p2 if buying the product from firm B. Firms’
A and B profits are piAuu = (p− c)x˜ and piBuu = (p− c)(1− x˜) respectively, where x˜ is the
location of a consumer that is indiference between purchasing a unit from firm A or from
firm B. It is easy to show that in equilibrium, the price and the firms’ profits are given by
puu = c+ t, piAuu = piBuu = t2 .
Next, we analyze the scenario where both firms follow PAYW strategy (PP): In this
case a consumer located in x < 12 will purchase from firm A as the consumption utility from
firm A’s product, V − tx, is higher that that from firm B’s product, which is V − t(1− x).
This consumer will then pay c+λ (V − tx− c) to firm A. Similarly, a consumer located at
x > 12 will buy from firm B and pays c+λ (V − t(1− x)− c) to firm B. Therefore, firms’
profits are piApp = λ
∫ 1
2
0 (V − tx− c)dx and piBpp = λ
∫ 1
1
2
[V − t (1− x)− c]dx respectively. It is
easy to show that piApp = piBpp =
λ (4V−t−4c)
8 .
Finally, we analyze the scenario where firm A follows the PAYW strategy and firm
B follows the PAAP (PU ). Denote a consumer’s maximum willingness to pay to firm A
given firm B’s price as pt . pt is the price that makes the consumer indifferent between
buying from firm A and firm B, which is determined by V − tx− pt = V − t (1− x)− p2
and results in pt = t (1−2x)+ p2. We assume that a consumer will buy from firm A if
and only if pt ≥ c and she will pay c+ λ (pt − c) if he buys from firm A. This implies
that a consumer will buy from firm A if the maximum surplus he can get from firm A
and still being fair (i.e., paying at lease c) is higher than the surplus she can get from firm
B. Then she will give a λ portion of the maximum total surplus from the transcation,
pt − c, to firm A if she buys from it. From pt ≥ c, we have x ≤ t−c+p22t . Thus, consumers
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with x ≤ t−c+p22t buys from firm A while the others buy from firm B. Firms’ A and B
profits are then given by piApu =
∫ t−c+p2
2t
0 λ (pt − c)dx = λ
∫ t−c+p2
2t
0 [t (1−2x)+ p2− c]dx and
piBpu = (p2− c)
(
1− t−c+p22t
)
. Solving for the optimal price of firm B, we obtain p2 = c+ t2 .
Consequently, firms A and B profits are given by piApu = 9tλ16 and pi
B
up =
t
8 respectively.
Because piAuu ≥ piApu → λ ≤ 89 , piBpp ≥ piBpu → λ ≥ t4V−4c−t , and t4V−4c−t < 89 as V > 2t+c
is required for the full market coverage under UU case, we have UU to be equilibrium if
λ ≤ 89 and PP to be equibrium if λ ≥ t4V−4c−t . For PP to be equibrium of Pareto dominance,
we need pipp > piuu → λ > 4t4V−4c−t . Also, 4t4V−4c−t < 89 as V > 2t + c. Therefore, PP is
the Pareto dominance equilibrium if λ > λ ∗ = 4t4V−4c−t and PP is the unique equilibrium
if λ > 89 . Note that ∂λ
∗
∂ t =
16(V−c)
(4V−4c−t)2 > 0.
G- This section reports a numerical study of the PAYW and PAAP strategies analyzed
in this paper for values of β > γ . Below are the profits expression of the PAAP and the
PAYW strategies when β > 0 and ri follows a trapezoid distribution:
piu =
[3−2a− c(1−a)+Z] [2ac−a−2c+Z] [3+ c−a(1+ c)+Z]
27(1−a)2 (1+β )3(1+λβ ) ,
and
pip =
λ
6 (1− c)
2[2(2+ c)−a(1+2c)],
where,
Z =
√
[a− (1−a)c]2 +3(1−a)(1+ac).
We constructed 180 scenarios from all combinations of the following parameters: c (0,
0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8), beta (1.5, 4, 6.5, 9) and a (0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1, 1.25, 1.5, 1.75, 2). The
following tables contain the threshold values of (λ ∗) such that for values of λ > λ ∗, PAYW
strategy is optimal and for λ < λ ∗ PAAP strategy is optimal.
c=0:
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a β
1.5 4 6.5 9
0 0.353 0.214 0.154 0.12
0.25 0.337 0.203 0.145 0.113
0.5 0.320 0.191 0.136 0.105
0.75 0.303 0.179 0.127 0.098
1 0.286 0.167 0.118 0.091
1.25 0.269 0.156 0.109 0.084
1.5 0.256 0.146 0.103 0.079
1.75 0.246 0.140 0.098 0.075
2 0.242 0.138 0.096 0.074
c=0.2:
a β
1.5 4 6.5 9
0 0.332 0.199 0.142 0.110
0.25 0.322 0.192 0.137 0.106
0.5 0.311 0.184 0.131 0.101
0.75 0.299 0.176 0.124 0.096
1 0.286 0.167 0.118 0.091
1.25 0.272 0.157 0.111 0.085
1.5 0.258 0.148 0.104 0.080
1.75 0.247 0.141 0.099 0.076
2 0.242 0.138 0.096 0.074
23
c=0.4:
a β
1.5 4 6.5 9
0 0.315 0.187 0.133 0.103
0.25 0.310 0.183 0.130 0.101
0.5 0.303 0.179 0.127 0.098
0.75 0.295 0.173 0.123 0.095
1 0.286 0.167 0.118 0.091
1.25 0.275 0.159 0.112 0.086
1.5 0.262 0.151 0.106 0.082
1.75 0.249 0.142 0.100 0.077
2 0.242 0.138 0.096 0.074
c=0.6:
a β
1.5 4 6.5 9
0 0.303 0.179 0.127 0.098
0.25 0.300 0.176 0.125 0.097
0.5 0.296 0.174 0.123 0.095
0.75 0.292 0.171 0.121 0.093
1 0.286 0.167 0.118 0.091
1.25 0.278 0.161 0.114 0.088
1.5 0.267 0.154 0.108 0.084
1.75 0.253 0.145 0.102 0.078
2 0.242 0.138 0.096 0.074
24
c=0.8:
a β
1.5 4 6.5 9
0 0.293 0.172 0.122 0.094
0.25 0.292 0.171 0.121 0.0935
0.5 0.291 0.170 0.120 0.0929
0.75 0.289 0.169 0.119 0.0921
1 0.286 0.167 0.118 0.091
1.25 0.281 0.164 0.116 0.0892
1.5 0.275 0.159 0.112 0.0865
1.75 0.262 0.151 0.106 0.0815
2 0.242 0.138 0.096 0.0741
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